De la mano de la razón de Hume, firmamos un tratado sobre un mundo natural humano de conceptos abstractos y la fuerza misma que da la intención de la vida.

No discovery coued have been made more happily for deciding all controversies concerning ideas, than that abovementioned, that impressions always take the precendency of them, and that every idea, with which the imagination is furnished, first makes its appearance in correspondent impression. These letters perceptions are all so clear and evident, that they admit of no controversy; though many of our ideas are so obscure, that it is almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even though there be a real successions in the objects.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

The true perfection of anything consists in its conformity to its standard.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and aversions.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest skepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects that exceed all human capacity.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

Reason can never shew us the connection of one object with another, though aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call credulity, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from influence of resemblance.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

For we many establish it as general maxim in this science of human natural, that wherever there is close relation betwixt two ideas, the mind is very apt to mistake them, and in all its discourses and reasonings to use the one for the other.

[...]

Resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of the mind, which we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish them. This last circumstance is of great consequence, and we may in general observe, that wherever the actions fo the mind in forming any two ideas are the same or resembling, we are very apt to confound these ideas, and take the one for the other.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

It is usual for men to use words for ideas, and to talk instead of thinking in their reasonings.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).

As to those impressions, which arise from the sense, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the create power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being.

— David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1738–40).